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1. Introduction  
The management of new product development (NPD) processes is a continual challenge 
facing organizations that develop complex, innovative products. While market trends are 
forcing shorter product development times in order to meet time-to-market (TTM) goals, 
companies are trying to develop mechanisms to streamline their NPD processes. One 
approach that has provided much success towards achieving shorter TTM is concurrent 
engineering (Winner et al., 1988; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Blackburn, 1991; Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992; Smith and Reinersten, 1991). Concurrent engineering (CE) can broadly be 
defined as the integration of inter-related functions at the outset of the product development 
process in order to minimize risk and reduce effort downstream in the process, and to better 
meet customers’ needs (Winner et al., 1988). Multi-functional teams, concurrency of 
product/process development, integration tools, information technologies, and process 
coordination are among the elements that enable CE to improve the performance of the 
product development process (Blackburn, 1991). The traditional NPD process suffers many 
setbacks. This process evolves in a sequential fashion, where phases follow one another 
serially, each one dominated by a single functional role. There is little or no cross-
communication among various functions, and information generated from one activity gets 
handed off to the next only after its completion. The commonly encountered problems with 
this type of process are increased downstream effort, process span time, i.e., the start to 
finish time of the process, and costs.  
In order to study and evaluate the performance of CE and sequential NPD processes, a 
new approach is used based on an existing mathematical technique called the expected 
payoff method, which is the basis of decision theory. Under this framework, the 
mathematics which describe the micro-processes, such as information sharing between 
team members and overlapping of activities, and their relationships with the macro-
process performance in terms of expected payoff (where the macro-process is the overall 
development process), are described. Network diagrams are presented as a formalism for 
expressing product development processes. The fundamental concept of the model is 
based on the premise that team members make decisions or choose actions that maximize 
the payoff (utility or usefulness) that their actions bring to the team. Team members must 
obtain, process, and communicate information to one another to make decisions that will 
optimize their performance.  
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This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing literature, and 
highlights the contributions of the research. Section 3 explains the characteristics of NPD 
processes. In Section 4, the expected payoff method is described and the results of the 
mathematical analysis are presented. The results are detailed in Section 5, and in Section 6, 
conclusions and paths for future research are presented.  
2. Literature review 
In this section, a review of the relevant theoretical and analytical research is presented. 
Krishnan et al. (1997) developed a deterministic model based on properties of the design 
process that help to determine when and how two development activities should be 
overlapped (Figure 1). These properties are defined as ‘upstream information evolution’ and 
‘downstream iteration sensitivity’. The former is the rate at which upstream information 
converges to a final solution, and the information is modeled as an interval that gets refined 
over time. Sensitivity describes how vulnerable the downstream activity is to any changes in 
the upstream information, and is defined by the time needed by the downstream activity to 
incorporate the changes, which represents rework. Different patterns of information 
exchange between two activities, represented by the arrows in the diagram, are studied.  
Upstream A
Downstream B
Span Time 
Upstream Evolution of information 
from an interval to a final point 
Impact of preliminary information on 
downstream activity: rework 
Information 
exchange/transfer 
between A and B 
Level of overlap between A and B 
 
Fig. 1. Krishnan et al.’s model. 
The authors address the overlapping problem by studying how values of the two properties 
determine the extent to which overlapping is appropriate between the dependent activities, 
A and B, and consequently how the span time is affected. Various overlapping policies 
between the upstream and downstream activities are examined based on varying the values 
of these two properties, and an integer program is developed to minimize span time.  
Loch and Terwiesch (1998) have developed an analytical model of CE that considers the 
overlapping of two sequentially dependent activities, an upstream product design activity, 
and a downstream process design activity. The authors study the trade-offs between the 
downstream activity using upstream preliminary information to overlap activities, and the 
corresponding delay this might cause in terms of downstream rework. They suggest that 
when engineering changes (EC) arise during the product design, this poses the risk of 
redoing the overlapped work of the downstream activity, and this can be significant if the 
dependency between the two activities is high. They propose that communication during 
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overlapping can reduce rework effects, but at the cost of communication time. They also use 
the concepts of evolution and sensitivity.  
Yassine et al. (1999) have studied the CE problem of overlapping activities through a 
decision analytic framework. Using a probabilistic model consisting of an upstream activity 
and a downstream activity, their methodology finds the optimal overlapping policy based 
on the study of independent, dependent, and interdependent activities, described as the 
information structure of a process. A schedule of when to transfer information based on the 
information structures can fall under one of three categories: sequential, partial overlapping, 
and concurrent. Sequential transfer of information takes place for dependent activities. 
Partial overlapping can take place for either dependent or interdependent activities. In both 
cases, however, the information exchange/transfer must appropriately minimize the risk of 
downstream rework in the event of a change in the upstream activity. A concurrent 
schedule can take place when the activities are independent; since neither requires 
information from the other to proceed, they may be executed in parallel.  
Ha and Porteus (1995) developed a simple model that proposes the optimal policy for the 
frequency and timing of progress reviews in an overlapped process. The authors study 
two overlapped, interdependent activities, an upstream design activity and a downstream 
process activity. In contrast to sequentially dependent activities, the nature of 
interdependent activities requires team members to communicate frequently. They 
develop a dynamic program that shows that, in order for overlapped activities to be 
beneficial, the design activity must be accompanied by progress reviews to minimize the 
risk of downstream rework and thus span time, and to improve quality. However, these 
gains are only achieved at the expense of the time and cost spent on communication. 
Therefore, the frequency of communication or progress reviews must be balanced with 
the value gained from having them. The optimal policy of reviews minimizes span time 
by providing sufficient information at the right time, helping to identify potential design 
problems early. 
Different methods to address the problem of overlapping have been suggested in the 
literature. This research contributes to the existing work by introducing a methodology 
based on decision theory to study the performance of processes.  
3. NPD processes 
An information processing view of organizations, and thus of product development, is 
assumed in this research. From this perspective, the product development process must go 
through a set of decision-making processes to transform information inputs into information 
outputs, which are used to develop tangible outputs, i.e., the end product(s) (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991; Galbraith, 1973). Therefore, the focus of the models is on the flow of 
information as it evolves from the beginning to the end of the development process, making 
the relationships between development activities more readily apparent. 
Product development can be defined as the process of undertaking all the activities and 
processing the information required to develop a concept for a product up to the product’s 
market introduction. NPD processes may vary from one organization to the next, and as 
such, there is no one standard process agreed to by all. However, the general steps required 
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in a product development process are fundamentally similar (Ulrich and Eppinger 2011). 
The NPD process defined in this study is a generic one which outlines the major steps in 
product development. It is a summary of the common phases and activities used in many 
instances in the literature as well as in the case study, and as such, it is a reasonably 
accepted approach to representing the product development process (Schilling and Will, 
1998; Nihtila, 1999; Eastman, 1980).  
The NPD process, shown in Figure 2, begins with the development of a concept for a 
marketable product (Phase A). In this phase, market requirements are determined, new 
ideas are generated, screened for economic and technical feasibility, and one is selected. In 
Phase B, ‘Definition’, a set of specifications to make the product is defined, and the product 
architecture is developed. Phase C, ‘Development’, consists of detailed design, physical 
prototyping, and testing. Finally, in Phase D, ‘Implementation’, the product volume is 
ramped up in manufacturing and launched onto the market.  
 
 
Critical 
Design 
Review
A 
 
CONCEPT  
 
B  
 
DEFINITION
C  
 
DEVELOPM ENT
D  
IM PLEM EN-
TATION  
 
Accept/
Reject 
End 
Project 
 
Preliminary 
Review  
 
Fig. 2. A schematic diagram for a general stage-gate process with Phases A, B, C, D. 
Figure 2 is an example of the traditional NPD process, where the phases are performed 
sequentially one after the other. Between phases, a one-way dependence is assumed, that is, 
the downstream phase depends on information generated by the upstream phase, but not 
vice-versa. This is represented by the uni-directional arrows between phases.  
In an NPD process, the relationship between product and process design is mutually 
interdependent (Tian et al., 1998). This means that the information generated by one or more 
functions poses contingencies for others, thus, the parameters of the product and the process 
should be considered simultaneously (Adler 1995). Therefore a higher degree of 
coordination is required to manage more people collaborating on interdependent activities. 
In a sequential process, this interdependence is ignored; a dependent relationship is 
assumed, and this leads to unplanned coordination downstream. While better management 
of interdependencies does lead to shortened span time as compared to the sequential 
process, the price is higher cost of upstream effort. 
CE uses two main mechanisms to reduce the span time for NPD processes: 1) increased 
information sharing from the start of a project (functional participation), and 2) overlapping 
of phases and activities. In a CE process, functional participation takes place through the 
formation of a team consisting of a representative from each of the functions that contribute 
to the development of a product. The goal is to make downstream activities easier to 
perform by releasing preliminary information to them early in the process to allow for 
overlap of activities. However, due to uncertainty in the early stages of an NPD process, the 
release of incomplete information to downstream functions may potentially introduce the 
need for rework should there be a change in upstream information. Thus, potential risks 
must be carefully examined to ensure that added time and effort are kept to a minimum 
(Krishnan et al., 1997). 
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Compared to a sequential approach, CE can decrease span time at the expense of increased 
interdependencies between activities (sequential to reciprocal). To handle the increased 
interdependencies, close intensive coordination is required through functional participation. 
However, this may increase effort.  
Figure 3 shows an overlapped CE process. Note that information flows are more frequent 
than in the sequential case, and they are also bi-directional. Major milestones exist at the 
same gates as before, and each phase is made up of activities, not shown in the figure.  
 
A - CONCEPT 
B - DEVELOPMENT 
C - DEFINITION 
D - IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Fig. 3. CE development process. 
4. Expected payoff method 
In this section, a mathematical approach is described to measure the performance of 
processes, namely, sequential and CE processes, through the study of macro- and micro-
variables. The macro-variable is the expected payoff, while the micro-variables are team 
interaction and level of overlap. The concepts of information processing and decision-
making are presented as the basis of this framework. An information processing view is 
assumed, so that processes are studied through the way in which several team members 
perform activities such as acquiring, communicating, and processing information in order to 
make decisions, which in turn organizes the way activities are executed. Processes and 
corresponding team activities are modeled via networks of interconnected elements. These 
elements transform inputs into outputs, and represent people, machines, or other real-world 
objects. Each network realizes an output which is a measure of process performance, and is 
used to evaluate and compare processes. The methodology is based on the expected payoff 
method, a technique used in decision theory. It is applied in the calculation of a simple 
model of both a sequential and a CE process, and the results are compared.  
The principle of the expected payoff method has been applied mainly in the field of 
economics, management science, and in certain areas of artificial intelligence, with respect to 
decision-making. In this field, economists study ‘the best use of available (limited) 
resources’ (Marschak and Radner, 1972). There has been no use of this method in the 
evaluation of CE in new product development processes. In an organizational environment, 
teams are also concerned with making the best use of alternatives or limited resources. The 
interested reader can find several readings in the literature on the principle of utility theory 
and its various applications (Marschak and Radner, 1972; Fishburn, 1970; Marschak, 1959; 
Marschak, 1954; von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1943). The framework developed in this 
part of the research will compare a simple model of a sequential process to a CE process, 
and evaluate the two in terms of the total expected payoff. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Numerical Modelling 
 
234 
4.1 Methodology 
The approach assumes that individuals in a team work towards achieving common goals 
with common interests and beliefs, within the constraints of their work, all of which guide 
their behavior. Given the complexities of such a situation, the problem is allocating 
appropriate information at the right time, such that team members can make the ‘right’ 
decisions which serve to accomplish their common goals (Marschak and Radner, 1972). This 
chapter will describe the means by which the activities of teams can be described, as well the 
mathematical analysis which can evaluate team performance, namely, through the use of the 
expected payoff method. The expected utility or payoff of an action measures the usefulness 
that an action brings to a person. By combining this with probability theory, decision theory 
helps a person determine that the action which maximizes his or her expected payoff over 
all possible actions (from this point forward, for simplicity, the term ‘his’ will be understood 
to include ‘his/her’). The development of the expected payoff function will be described in 
detail. Processes can be explicitly represented through network diagrams that illustrate the 
activities that team members must perform, the inter-relatedness of activities through 
information requirements, and the communication required among team members (Figure 
4). A network realizes a response function, or outcome function, which is based on the 
actions of the individuals in the organization, and these actions affect the outcome or 
expected payoff. Among various possible network configurations, the network with the 
greatest expected payoff is considered optimal. 
 Network Modeling Method 
Macro-Variable 
   - Expected Payoff  
 
Action a 
Team members
Inputs Output 
Micro-level interactions
Response 
Function
Micro-variables 
- Overlapping 
- Team interaction
 Overlapping 
Performance 
Indicator 
Development 
Process 
 
Fig. 4. Expected payoff conceptual model. 
An upcoming section describes how network diagrams are constructed, as well as the 
mathematical tools which compute and evaluate the networks to obtain the total expected 
payoff. 
4.2 Mathematical model: Definition of fundamental quantities 
In the following sections, the fundamental quantities of the expected payoff model are 
defined mathematically. 
4.2.1 Actions and outcomes  
Faced with a set of alternatives, the decision made by the decision-maker is called his action, 
a. An action, or decision, can have more than one outcome (or result or consequence). This is 
denoted as r = ǒ (a), where ǒ is the outcome function of the action taken. The possible 
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outcomes also depend on external factors out of the decision-maker’s control, which can be 
called the environment, represented by the variable x. Since an outcome depends on both 
the action taken and the environment, the outcome function can now be expressed as r = ǒ 
(x, a). Because x is uncertain, the outcome variable r given a is also said to be uncertain. The 
decision problem now is made up of a set X of alternative states of the environment x, a set 
A of all possible actions a, a set R of all possible outcomes r, and an outcome function ǒ from 
X x A to r, giving the outcome of each state-action pair, r = ǒ (x, a).  
4.2.2 Decision rules 
The problem of choosing among alternative actions can be generalized by saying that 
individuals choose among rules of actions or strategies, rather than from a set of possible 
actions alone. In an organization, rules of action play a very big role in contingency 
planning, where team members must decide in advance how they will respond to incoming 
information. This is obviously important in making economic decisions because individuals 
must be ready to act as soon as they can (e.g. stock brokers). In the context of an engineering 
firm, if a task is to design and develop a new product and get it to market as quickly as 
possible, the designers make use of incoming information as soon as they receive it, and 
they must additionally decide upon how much of it should be transferred to downstream 
functions, and when.  
An action can now be described as a = ǂ (y), where ǂ is the decision function, and y is the 
information which will be obtained in the future. It should be noted that the information y is 
not the same as the variable x, the state of the environment, which describes information 
already received. The expression says that an action a depends upon the information y 
received. 
4.2.3 Information 
Information can be generated and obtained by team members through various means, such 
as through observation, communication, and/or computation. There are two sets of 
information available to the decision-maker: one is the set X of all possible states of the 
environment, and the other is the set Y of all possible information signals. An information 
signal y is a partition of the environment X. The information structure η is the partitioning of 
X into different signals of y. Therefore, a signal y will correspond to each x in X. An 
information structure is thus defined as y = η (x). Any partition of X can be viewed as a way 
to describe the states of the environment. As an example, suppose a marketing manager can 
offer a customer a product in small, medium, or large. The customer wants either small or 
medium. The marketing manager must make a decision about which size to choose, which 
will impact the design of the product, and the information relevant to his decision is the size 
small or medium. The set X of all possible sizes is thus partitioned into one subset, small, 
and another subset, medium, and this partitioning defines the information structure, η.  
4.3 Expected payoff 
The expected payoff method is based on the premise that every individual has preferences 
as to how to prioritize a list of alternatives due to personal beliefs or interests (assuming that 
the individual is consistent). Preferences can be described by the ranking of alternatives 
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according to some subjective probability distribution, consistent with what the person 
believes will happen. Under uncertainty, each of the alternatives is an action which may 
result in one or more outcomes, as discussed.  
In this sense, the term ‘utility’ refers to the usefulness an action brings to an individual. For 
the order of preference given to all actions, each position can be assigned a single number 
representing the utility of each, or a person’s desirability of the occurrence of an event, thus 
capturing his preferences. The probability of each action occurring is represented by the 
subjective probability assignments. The expected utility of an action is therefore the sum of 
the utilities of its various possible outcomes, weighted by the probability of each outcome’s 
occurrence. 
Given these basic definitions described in the previous section, for a set R of alternative 
outcomes r1… rN, if Zi(a) denotes the event that an action a results in the outcome ri (since 
ri = ǒ (x, a)), then the “expected utility”  for an action a is:  
  (a; ǒ, Ǒ,  ) =  ( ri) Ǒ [Zi(a)] (1) 
where: 
Ǒ = subjective probability function  
 = utility function.  
The left-hand side of the expected utility function in (1) shows that the expected utility 
depends only on the decision-maker’s action, given the functions ǒ, Ǒ, and , which describe 
the factors which are out of his control. The individual’s actions are under his control, and 
his goal is to choose the action which maximizes the corresponding expected utility. In the 
utility function  (r) in (1), r can be replaced to obtain the new payoff function ω:  (r) =  [ǒ 
(x, a)] ≡ ω (x, a). The expression in (1) can be further simplified by stating that, given the set 
X of alternative states of the environment x, the probability of the state x can be written as Φ 
(x) = Ǒ ({x}), where Φ is the probability density (or mass) function, and x is assumed to be a 
random variable that is normally distributed. This expression is, in other words, the 
probability of the set X consisting of the single element x denoted by {x}. The expected utility 
function in (1) can be re-written as: 
 Ω (a; ω, Φ) ≡ E ω (x, a) = Σ ω (x, a) Φ (x) (2) 
The expression in (2) can now be called the expected payoff of the action a, where the 
expected utility depends on the decision-maker’s action only, and where ω and Φ describe 
the factors uncontrolled by the decision-maker. Though the utility and the probability 
functions may be thought of as being controllable, it is assumed for simplicity that they are 
not, and that they are treated as givens of the problem. By replacing the actions by decision 
rules, and introducing the information structure into the equation, the payoff function can 
be re-written as: 
 ω (x, a) = ω [x, ǂ (y)] = ω [(x, ǂ (η (x))] (3) 
From this, the expected payoff becomes: 
 U = Σ ω [(x, ǂ (η (x))] Φ (x) ≡ Ω (η, ǂ; ω, Φ) (4) 
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The expected payoff now depends on the decision function ǂ and the information structure 
η, and on the factors over which the decision-maker has no control, namely ω, and Φ. The 
information structure η is assumed to be under the control of the team member; each 
member has the ability to observe and partition the information into the subsets needed for 
his activity. The individual has more than one pair (η, ǂ) available, and he will choose the 
one that maximizes U. This expression is the measure that describes the performance of the 
various processes through the evaluation of actions under uncertainty. It is used to evaluate 
the process network diagrams to be developed in upcoming sections. The optimal process 
structure will be that which maximizes the expected payoff of the network under certain 
conditions, given the probability distribution of the states of the environment. 
4.3.1 Expected payoff as a quadratic function 
The payoff function can be expressed as a quadratic function of the team action variables. 
Although this is an approximation, it is useful. The quadratic function is one that has been 
used to describe many real-life phenomena, such as in economics for the law of diminishing 
returns. The concave quadratic function describes the expected payoff function in that there 
is a point that is optimum, i.e., the maximum point, and before and after this point, the 
value of the payoff decreases. The use of functions of orders higher than two is very 
complex and difficult to solve, and a linear function is neither sufficient nor appropriate to 
describe the present phenomena in detail since it is not expected that the payoff function 
continuously increases or decreases. Also, since the goal here is to make comparisons 
between two process structures, the relative comparisons do not require the payoff function 
to be exact. Taking the case of two members in a team, 1 and 2, where each must make a 
decision, then the quadratic payoff function can be chosen as: 
 u = -a12 – a22 + 2Q a1 a2 - 2η1 (x) a1 - 2η2 (x) a2  (5) 
(the use of functions of x will be suppressed for simplicity in the future). 
This particular form of the quadratic function is similar to the one used by Marschak and 
Radner (1972), with some of the coefficients chosen to simplify calculations. In the above 
expression, Q measures the interaction between a1 and a2, the action variables of team 
members 1 and 2, respectively, and must be between zero and one. The interaction is one of 
the micro-variables of the process model. For M action variables, if the second derivative of 
the expected payoff function exists, then a measure of the interaction between the action 
variables i and j is ∂2ω /∂ai∂aj. In other words, it measures “the degree to which a change in 
action j influences the effect of a change in action i on the payoff for given values of the other 
action variables and of x” (Marschak and Radner, 1972, p.101). The functions η1 (x) and η2 
(x) are related to the information structure. 
The assumption that the payoff is quadratic gives meaning to the variances and the 
correlations of the information variables. Normal distributions are fully described by their 
means and variances. The variance can help gauge uncertainty, as it takes the difference 
between the maximum and minimum values of x. For multivariate distributions, the 
correlation coefficient describes the degree of statistical interdependence between variables 
(above, r describes the correlation between two variables). Due to the interdependencies in 
processes, it is often important to understand how one variable affects another. Whether this 
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is the correlation between action variables or the environment variables, it is reasonable that 
these correlations may affect the information structure and/or probability of occurrence 
chosen by the organizer. Another simplification is the normalizing assumption, where each 
variable is considered to be measured from its mean, so that m = 0, and E (m) = 0. There is 
no loss of meaning since this is simply a coordinate transformation. In this case, the 
correlation coefficient becomes:  
 r = r12 = Ex1x2/s1s2, or  
 Ex1x2 = r * s1s2.  
These properties of probability distributions will be useful in solving the expected payoff 
functions and determining the macro-variables of interest, discussed in upcoming sections. 
4.3.2 Multi-person teams 
For n members in a team, then there will also be n information structures and n decision 
rules. Each member i chooses an action ai from set Ai of all possible alternatives. The payoff 
function can be written as: 
 u = ω (x, a1 ,a2 ...)  
where u is now the utility to the team (and to each of its members). Although ai is the action 
variable controlled by the ith member, ai itself can be an m-tuple of many distinct variables, 
each controlled by the ith member. If there is no interaction among the action variables, then 
the payoff is said to be additive, and the form of the expression becomes: 
 ω (x, a) = Σ ω i (x, ai)   
If, however, there are interactions among action variables, then the quadratic function must 
include an extra term to express this interaction, namely Q, as before. 
4.3.3 Team decision functions and information functions 
In a single person team, the person’s action is related to the decision function through a = 
ǂ(y). For a multi-person team, there are now n decision functions, ǂ = (ǂ1 … ǂn) and ai = 
ǂ1( yi). The same decision rules as before can be applied for a team. The joint action of the 
team members is a = (a1,… an), and y = (y1 , ... yn) is the team information, so there are n 
decision functions, and the team decision rule can then be denoted as ǂ = (ǂ1, ǂ2,…. ǂn). 
The same expression for an action a = ǂ(y) for a single person team is also applicable for 
teams, keeping in mind what each term means individually. The information structure for 
each team member can be expressed as yi = ηi (x), and for the team, the information 
structure is η = (η1,... η n). Then, for y = η (x), and a = ǂ (y), a = ǂ [η (x)] applies for the team 
action. The payoff of the team can be written, as before: 
 u = ω (x, a1 ,a2 ,…) = ω (x, ǂ 1 [η1 (x)], ... ǂ n [ηn (x)]) = ω (x, ǂ [η (x)],  
and the expected payoff of the team is: 
 E (u) = Ω (η, ǂ) = E (ω (x, ǂ [η (x)]) (6) 
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4.3.4 Consideration of time 
All the discussion up until now has involved the static case of the team decision problem, 
but time can be incorporated into the various concepts. If one team member’s action at time t 
(t = 1,...T) is ai(t), and x(t) is the state of the world at time t, then the team action variable 
becomes: 
 a = [a1(1),…an(1),...an(T)],  
and the state of the world is: 
 x = [x(1),...x(T)].  
For yi (t) = ηi (x, t ), the action variable becomes: 
 ai(t)= ai[ηi (x,t ),t ].  
An important assumption of this situation is that for actions that are spaced apart in time, 
the larger the time difference, the less the interaction between those actions. Therefore, it is 
assumed for simplicity that the actions that are distant in time need less coordination than 
those that are closer together. The payoff function with no interaction is thus additive in 
time, and can be expressed as:  
 ω (x, a) = Σ ωt [x, a (t)] (for t=1,…T).  
4.4 Design of network models 
Networks can be used as a powerful tool to represent and evaluate the structure of a 
process, and more specifically, the structure of information flow and work patterns in a 
team. A network can be defined as a system of interconnected elements, all of which work 
together to produce a desired output. A network consists of the following basic 
components: 
- element (represented by a circle): the component which has the function of 
transformation of information. An element can represent a human being, a machine, a 
communication tool, etc., in the process of performing an activity. 
- input(s) (represented by an arc into the element): required for each element. These 
inputs are various types of information (e.g. information or actions coming from the 
previous element’s output, noise from the environment, team members’ personal 
knowledge or expertise, etc.). 
- output(s) (denoted by an arc leaving the element): the result of each element. This can 
be in the form of 1) processed information, 2) a simple relay or distribution of 
information, or 3) an action being sent out as a result of the transformation process, 
either to another element or to the environment. 
Each element in a network has an input which is transformed into or transferred as an 
output; the message of this output then feeds into one or more downstream elements. 
Elements are connected to one another through the input and output arcs, which carry 
information messages to and from elements. Messages coming from the environment (i.e., 
external to the organization) are called observations. Messages from one element to another 
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are communication, while messages going out into the environment are called actions. In the 
context of an organization, networks can be used to represent processes from an information 
processing point of view. Once all intermediate elements have been completed, a final 
action(s) is issued, which signals project completion. Networks can be organized according 
to time structure. 
4.4.1 Connections between elements 
The connections between elements in a network can be described in the form of a square 
array. For each element i and j, the set of all possible messages that can be sent from i to j, is 
denoted by Bij. Any messages that come from outside, that is, from the environment, are 
described by the set Zi, and Ei which denotes the set of all possible values of noise coming 
from the environment to element i. This noise can be information that is observed from 
outside the organization, such as customer input, best practices, etc. The messages sent out 
to the environment are defined as the action variables, a = (a1, … an), for n actions, where a 
is the team action variable.  
The set Bi0 denotes the set of all possible messages from element i to the environment. This 
set will consist either of the Cartesian product of some sets Aj, where for each j, Aj is the set 
of all possible values that action variable aj can take, or it will be empty since not all 
elements will have an action as an output. The set B0i is symmetric to this set, and it 
represents the set of all possible messages from the environment outside to an element i, 
which is the Cartesian product of Zi and Ei. Therefore, the set Bi of possible alternative 
output messages of element i is denoted by Bi = Π Bij (j=0...m). For m elements, the set B́i of 
combined messages from other elements to i is given by B́i = Π Bki (k=0...m). The 
transformation of each element i is expressed through the task function ǃi = (ǃi0,..., ǃim), 
which transforms each input message into an output message. The set Bii is empty as it is 
assumed that messages will not be sent from an element to itself. Figure 5 below shows an 
example of a simple network diagram. The corresponding square array consisting of the sets 
Bij in Table 1 illustrates message transfers between elements in the figure. The symbol Φ 
denotes an empty set.  
 
 
1  2  
 3  
 4 5
 
 
Fig. 5. Simple network diagram. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Numerical Evaluation of Product Development Processes 
 
241 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0  B01 B02    
1    B13   
2    B23   
3     B34 B35 
4 B40      
5 B50      
Table 1. Information dependencies. 
The time distribution and spatial distribution of members in a team must be separated. For 
teams in a dynamic environment, networks are divided into time periods by several 
elements based on the structure of information flow, which is illustrated by elements broken 
down into intermediate stages or actions. Figures 6 and 7 show the network diagrams of 
possible sequential and CE processes. 
 
ε         ε       ε        ε     ε   ε 
   1        2         3          4       5   6 
 T1
'  T2
' 
 
Fig. 6. Sequential network diagram. 
 ε     ε       ε
      ε      ε        ε 
   1        2         3     4 
T1 T2 T3 T4
 
Fig. 7. CE network diagram. 
In the context of NPD processes, as an example, an element i can be a designer who receives 
information ǆ from the environment, say from the customer. An action a can be the release 
of design specifications from the designer to another element, say the manufacturing 
resource. This resource then uses information from this action as well as information from 
observations through personal experience and/or company databases for example, 
transforms the new combined information, and takes an action, such as manufacturing the 
product. This action is sent out to the environment, i.e., the customer. 
4.5 Application to models 
A simple model is designed in this section using network diagrams and its evaluation using 
the expected payoff method will be studied. The main purpose here is to compare the 
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relative differences between process structures in terms of the expected payoff. In the 
evaluation that follows, the expected payoff function is equation (5), repeated here: 
 u = - a12 – a22 + 2Q a1 a2 - 2η1 a1 - 2η2 a2 (5) 
Recall that the coefficient “Q” in (5) denotes the interaction, specifically in this case between 
two overlapping activities occurring in the same time period. This function evaluates every 
step of performing work, and also evaluates the different processes as a whole (i.e., each 
intermediate step is evaluated using this function, as well as the overall structure of the 
network). 
4.5.1 Assumptions of the model 
In order to compare the two processes at the same level, some assumptions must be made to 
ensure consistency. First, both of the processes begin with the same input information 
variable ηi which is a random variable dependent upon x. Thus, the first member of each 
process begins by observing the same information that is coming from the environment. 
Another assumption in the model is that the members inside the organization not only 
receive information from other sources (i.e., other elements or the environment), they also 
contribute to the processing of their work through the use of their own expertise, which is 
denoted in the models by ǆ as an input into each element (Howard, 1966). However, this is 
considered as being a special state of the set X of information from the environment despite 
the fact that it comes from the element itself. Therefore, during the evolution of the activity, 
not only does the information that a member receives get processed, but also because each 
member is contributing his own knowledge and expertise, this pooled information adds 
value to the activity, which results in an increase in the expected payoff. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that the choice of the payoff function as a quadratic equation is 
appropriate since a quadratic function has a maximum point. This assumption is important 
and must be re-stated. Furthermore, since the expected payoff is the measure being used to 
compare relative process performance, an absolute measure is unnecessary, so the problem 
of defining a specific and accurate form of the function can be avoided. 
The cost of a network is not considered in the models. Marschak and Radner (1972) did not 
include this important factor explicitly in their decision functions, although they 
acknowledge its importance. There is a cost associated with decision-making, with how 
information is obtained, with team organization, etc. In the context of this research, cost was 
not chosen as a parameter of the models, however, since cost can help in assessing the trade-
offs of one process design over another. 
The sequential and CE process networks are created as sequences of single-period decision 
problems (see Figures 9 and 10), where the interaction between periods is assumed to be 
zero, i.e., Q=0, as previously discussed in Section 4.4.4. Thus, interaction is assumed to be 
zero across periods, though there is interaction within time periods. Therefore, it is assumed 
that the total payoff function is additive in time. In each time period, optimal decisions are 
made. This difference in interactions addresses the case for which the sum of the maximum 
expected payoffs is equal to maximum of the sum of expected payoffs. In other words: 
Max Σ E ω (x, a) = Σ Max E ω (x, a) = Σ E ω max (x, a). 
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Thus the maximum expected payoff is calculated in each period, which are the added up to 
give the total maximum expected payoff. In other words, the expected value of the 
maximum payoffs is equal to the total maximum expected payoffs for each period. 
Rework is not modeled in either the sequential or CE process. Though this is a simplifying 
assumption not characteristic of most NPD processes, the model is presented in basic form, 
with the intent of bringing out some essential features of the expected payoff method.  
The simple network shown below in Figure 8 will be defined here to illustrate how a 
network diagram is evaluated in terms of its gross expected payoff (‘gross’ since the cost of a 
network is not considered). The network is assumed to be in one time period, reflecting a 
single action. In cases when there is more than one element, each element in the network can 
be evaluated separately in terms of its expected payoff, and the total expected payoff is 
simply the sum of the individual ones. Actions taken at different times can be considered to 
be corresponding to different team members. 
 
 1 = x 
  
 a1 =  1 (1 +  )
 
Fig. 8. Action taken in one time period. 
Figure 8 illustrates an action. Element 1 has η1 = x as input variable, where η1 is a random 
variable dependent upon the state of nature x (which is suppressed). The state variable 
observed by the team member at element 1 is processed, which also receives some 
information ǆ from outside (qualified as information such as team member’s personal 
expertise), which, for simplicity, is considered to be a constant. This information is 
processed, and an action a1 is taken, which is a function of the inputs to the element. The 
information ǆ combined with the information µ1 is additive. With a single action, the payoff 
function is chosen as a quadratic in one input variable, in the form: 
 ω = -a12 + 2a1x (6) 
Taking the derivative of (6) with respect to a1 and setting it equal to zero gives: 
ω΄ (a1) = -2a1 + 2x = 0, and solving for a1gives the best decision function, denoted by ά: 
 ά (x) = x (7) 
which is the optimal decision. The second derivative of (6) is negative (-2), ensuring a 
maximum point, so plugging (7) back into (6) and taking the expected value of the payoff 
gives the following expected value of the maximum payoff: 
 Ω = E (x + ǆ)2 = s2  (8) 
where s2 is the variance of x. The decision function in equation (7) has a distribution of 
possible decisions, which implies that multiple choices can be made. Assuming that this 
distribution is normal, then, equation (8) shows that the payoff is equal to the variance. This 
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means that in making a decision, i.e., reducing possible choices to a single value, the payoff 
is equal to the value of the reduction of uncertainty of information. It is reasonable to 
conclude that the larger the variance, i.e., the more uncertain the decision, then, the more 
benefit (payoff) there is in making a decision. 
4.5.2 Sequential engineering network diagram 
The sequential engineering network diagram is illustrated in Figure 9, and consists of six 
time periods, T1 to T6, which represent the division of the sequential work done by six 
different functional team members. Team member 1 receives complete information 
represented by the state variable x, and then uses this information, along with his own 
expertise represented by ǆ, to complete his activity. At the end of his activity, he sends 
complete information to the downstream activity, which is again processed by the second 
team member. The output of this activity is a message sent to the next team member, etc. 
 
 
ε         ε       ε        ε     ε   ε 
  T1       T2      T3        T4      T5   T6 
 
Fig. 9. Sequential network diagram. 
Because of the assumption of no cross-functional communication in a sequential process, 
there is no interaction between team members, and the communication of information is 
assumed to be ‘over-the-wall’, thus even if there is some interaction, it is assumed to be so 
weak that it is negligible. 
Evaluation of the Network 
1. First Period T1: 
 1  2
  
η1(x) = x 
 a1 = 1[ + η1] = η2 
 a3 = 3{ + 2[ + η3]} = η4 
 3
 
 a2 = 2{ + 1[ + η2]} = η3 
 
Similar to the example above, team member 1 receives complete information, and every 
member within the network contributes his special technical knowledge to the flow, 
denoted by ǆ. As before, the payoff function is (6) and the expected payoff is (9): 
 ω = -a12 + 2a1x (6) 
 Ω1 = s02 (9) 
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where s02 = E(x + ǆ) 2.  
2. Second Period T2: 
As in time period 1, member 2 receives output x from element 1, giving the payoff: 
 Ω 2 = s12 (10) 
where s12 = E(x + ǆ + ǆ) 2.  
A similar procedure as above applies to each time period, up until time period six. The total 
Expected Value of the Maximum Payoff: 
 Ω = Σ (i = 1…6) Ω i = Ω 1+ Ω 2 + Ω 3 + Ω 4 + Ω 5 + Ω 6  
  = s02 + s12 + s22 + s32 + s42 + s52   
If it is assumed for simplicity that the variance for each information structure is the same, 
then the total expected payoff becomes: 
 Ω TOT = s02 + s12 + s22 + s32 + s42 + s52 = 6s2 (11) 
4.5.3 Concurrent engineering network diagram 
The concurrent engineering diagram shown in Figure 10 is an appropriate modification of 
the sequential engineering network. It takes into account the two teams of three members 
each, but this time with a few added features. The two teams’ activities are now overlapping 
in time periods T2 and T3. These two teams now are also communicating with each other 
through the transfer of information denoted by the arrows between overlapped activities. 
There is interaction between the two members from both teams in the same two time 
periods. Since rework is not modeled, overlapping part of the six time periods in the 
sequential process gives the resulting four time periods in the CE process. The main 
comparison of interest at this point is the difference between expected payoffs. 
 
 
 
 ε     ε       ε
      ε      ε        ε 
   1        2         3     4 
T1 T2  T3 T4
 
 
 
Fig. 10. CE network diagram. 
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Evaluation of the Network 
1. First Period T1: 
 
1 1(x) = x   a1 = 1[ + 1(x)] =  2 

 
Again, it is assumed that member 1 obtains complete information x, that is the information 
structure η1(x)=x. Also, every member within the network contributes his special technical 
knowledge to the processing and transferring of information. The output ǂ[x] = a1 is 
determined as before. Choosing u1= ω (x, a1) = -2a12 + 2a1[x + ǆ], the best decision function 
is: 
 ά [x] = x + ǆ  
and the expected value of the maximum payoff for the first time period is:  
 Ω 1 = s 02 (12) 
where s02 = E[x + ǆ]  
2. Second Period T2: 
 
 
 2  4
  
 2  
  2[2 + ]
  a4 = 4[ + 2(2 + )] 
 a2 = 2 [2 + ] 
 
The payoff function is: 
 ω(x, a) = -a22 – a42 + 2Q a2 a4 – 2  2 a2 – 2 4 a4 (13) 
Taking the first derivative of the payoff function first with respect to a2 and a4 setting each 
equal to zero: 
 ǅω/ǅa2 = -2a2 + 2Q a4 - 2  2 = 0 (14) 
 ǅω/ǅa4 = -2a4 + 2Q a2 - 2  4 = 0 (15) 
gives the following system of equations: 
  - a2 + Q a4 =  2 (16) 
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 Q a2 - a4 =  4 (17) 
Solving for a2 and a4 yields the following best decision functions for T2 period actions: 
 ά2 = [-1/(1-Q2)] *  2 + [-Q/(1-Q2)] *  4   
  = [-1/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ] (18) 
 ά4 = [-Q/(1-Q2)] * μ 2 + [-1/(1-Q2)] *  4   
  = [-Q/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ] (19) 
Plugging (18) and (19) into (13) gives the payoff for time period T2: 
 ω = [ 22 + 2Q  2  4 +  42]/ [1-Q2], (20) 
and the expected payoff is: 
 Ω 2 = Eω = [s12 + 2Qr12 s1 s2 + s22]/ [1-Q2] (21) 
where: 
s12 = E [x + ǆ + ǆ] 2 
s22 = E [x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ]2 
r12 = [E (x + ǆ + ǆ)(x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ)]/ s1 s2 
where r12 is the correlation coefficient and Q is the interaction. 
3. Third Period T3: 
 
 
 a2 = 2 [2 + ] 
  2[2 + ]
  a4 = 4[ + 2(2 + )] 
 3  5
  
 a3 = 3 [ + 2(2 + )] 
 
The payoff function is: 
 ω = -a32 – a52 + 2Q a3 a5 – 2  3 a3 – 2  5 a5 (22) 
where: 
  3 = ǆ + ά 2 = [-1/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ] + ǆ (23) 
  5 = ǆ + ά 2 = [-Q/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ] + ǆ (24) 
Performing the same calculations as in T2 gives the following best decision functions: 
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ά3 = [-1/(1-Q2)] *  3 + [-Q/(1-Q2)] *  5 
 = [-1/(1-Q2)] {-1/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ)+ ǆ} +  (25)
 [-Q/(1-Q2)] {-Q/(1-Q2)] * [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ}  
ά5 = [-Q/(1-Q2)] *  3 + [-1/(1-Q2)] *  5 
 = [-Q/(1-Q2)] {-1/(1-Q2)] [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ } + (26)
 [-1/(1-Q2)] {-Q/(1-Q2)] [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ }  
The expected payoff is: 
 Ω 3 = [s32 + 2Qr34s3 s4 + s42]/ [1-Q2] (27) 
where: 
s32 = E[-1/(1-Q2) [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ]2 
s42 = E[-Q/(1-Q2) [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] * (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ]2 
r34 = E[3  5]/ s3 s4 
4. Fourth Period T4: 
 
 6
 a5 = 5   a6 = 6

 
The payoff function is chosen as: 
 ω = -a62 + 2a6  6 (28) 
where: 
 6 = ǆ + ά 5 
  = (-Q/(1-Q2) {[-1/(1-Q2)] [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-Q/(1-Q2)] (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ] + ǆ  
  + (-1/(1-Q2) {[-Q/(1-Q2)] [x + ǆ + ǆ] + [-1/(1-Q2)] (x + ǆ + ǆ + ǆ) + ǆ] + ǆ}  (29) 
The best decision function is: 
 ά 6 =  6 (30) 
Therefore the expected value of the maximum payoff is: 
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 Ω 4 = s52 (31) 
where: 
 s52= E [ǆ + ά 5]2   
Total Expected Value of the Maximum Payoff: 
Ω = Σ (i = 1...4) Ω i = Ω 1+ Ω 2 + Ω 3 + Ω 4 
(32)
 = s02 + [s12 + 2Qr s1 s2 + s22]/ [1-Q2] + [s32 + 2Qr34s3 s4 + s42]/ [1-Q2] + s52 
 = [s02+ s52] + [s12 + s22 + s32 + s42]/ [1-Q2] + [2Q(r12 s1 s2 + r34s3 s4]/ [1-Q2] 
Ω TOT = A + B/[1-Q2] + CQ/[1-Q2] 
where the coefficients A, B, C are: 
A = s02+ s52 
B = s12 + s22 + s32 + s42 
C = 2(r12s1 s2 + r34s3 s4) 
5. Results 
From the calculations in the previous section, the total expected payoffs are summarized 
below for each of the two processes:  
Sequential: Ω TOT = s02 + s12 + s22 + s32 + s42 + s52  (11) 
CE: Ω TOT = A + B/[1-Q2] + CQ/[1-Q2] (32)  
where the coefficients A, B, and C are as before. The equation for the expected value of the 
maximum payoff for the sequential process is a constant with respect to Q, while for the CE 
process it is polynomial in Q. If it is assumed for simplicity that all variances are equal and 
the correlation coefficients are equal to zero, i.e., the information variables are independent, 
then Figure 11 depicts the resulting curves for each process. 
 
Sequential 
 
 CE 
   
    
     0   1
 Interaction Q
6s
2
 
 
Fig. 11. Expected payoff vs interaction. 
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This analysis shows that a CE process is always better than a sequential one in terms of 
expected value of the maximum payoff. This is contradictory to practical observations of 
both processes. This is due to the fact that the analytical model oversimplifies the sequential 
process, whereby it is assumed that there is virtually no interaction between phases, and 
that information is ‘thrown over the wall’ from one function to another. Under this 
assumption, there is no interaction, which naturally results in an expected payoff that is 
independent of the interaction, Q, thus giving a constant. Additionally, it is also assumed in 
the modeling process that the contribution of each member’s specialized information is the 
same for both the sequential and CE processes. This results in the total expected payoff for 
the sequential process being always lower than that of CE. Again, this assumption is not 
consistent with practical observations. In order to make the analysis more meaningful, some 
further assumptions should be made with regards to team members in a sequential process 
as compared to a CE process. 
In some practical situations, a sequential process can be better than a CE process (Krishnan 
et al., 1997). When this is true, in the modeling process it is reasonable to assume that for a 
sequential process, every team member’s knowledge and information is sufficient to allow 
him to finish his activity independently. In fact, it may even be argued that in a sequential 
process, the amount and types of information that functional members must possess is 
greater than members in a cross-functional team, which allows them to finish their activity 
independently. They must possess not only information about their own specialization, but 
they must also have, to some extent, information about other functions as well. After all, a 
designer will not design a product which requires milling if the company does not own a 
milling machine. In contrast, in a CE process, it can be assumed that members on a cross-
functional team do not need to possess as much information about other functions since 
sharing of information will occur naturally as a consequence of teamwork, in which case it is 
reasonable to assume that more work is required to obtain information. Therefore, the 
variance of knowledge and information measured by s2 is assumed to be larger for 
members in a sequential process than for the same members who would work in the 
overlapped periods in a CE process. This implies that the lack of information or knowledge 
by members in a CE process can be compensated by the exchange of information in the 
overlapped periods. 
Given this assumption, the straight line in Figure 11 would move up the y-axis, while the CE 
curve would remain the same. This would create a point of intersection between the two 
curves, indicating that, for a given point of interaction, one process will be superior to the 
other in terms of expected payoff. For simplicity, it is assumed that for the CE process, all 
variances are equal to 1, and that the correlation coefficients are equal to 0. It can be further 
assumed that team members 2, 3, 4, and 5 in a sequential process have a variance that is 
slightly higher than the same members in a CE process, who, as explained above, exchange 
information during the overlapped periods. For simplicity, the variance for the sequential 
members’ information is taken to be one-quarter higher than that of the CE members’ 
information i.e., si2 (sequential) = 1.25 si2 (CE). Plugging these values back into 11 and 32, 
the total expected payoffs are: 
Sequential: Ω TOT = 8.25  
CE: Ω TOT = 2 + 4/[1-Q2]  
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This analysis is now illustrated in Figure 12.  
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Fig. 12. Expected payoff vs interaction. 
The curve for the CE process shows how the expected value of the maximum payoff 
changes with interaction, showing that as team interaction increases, the expected payoff 
increases as well. For this particular case, it was found that a sequential process has a higher 
expected payoff when the interaction is lower than 0.6, and a CE process has a higher payoff 
for values of interaction greater than 0.6. In other words, the results show that when actions 
in a CE process highly influence one another, i.e., the interaction is higher than 0.6, then a 
CE process is more valuable in terms of expected value of the maximum payoff. If the 
interaction between action variables is not strong, i.e., less than 0.6, then the sequential 
process is sufficient, and superior in terms of expected payoff.  
In conclusion, the expected payoff method from decision theory provided some initial 
results in the comparison of a sequential and CE process. From the mathematical 
derivation presented in this chapter, comparing equation (11) to (32) shows that a CE 
process is always more valuable than a sequential process in terms of expected payoff. In 
most instances in reality, however, a sequential process has some benefit. Under the 
conditions when this holds true, the sequential process has a higher total expected payoff 
when the interaction intensity is low, while CE is better than a sequential process for high 
interaction. 
6. Conclusion 
The expected payoff method is presented here as a very simple introduction to studying 
NPD processes. A more elaborate and detailed development is in progress (Kong and 
Thomson, 2001), the results of which are expected to provide a major contribution to the 
existing body of work in studying organizational processes and their coordination.  
Some avenues for future research are now discussed. In the comparison of sequential and 
CE processes, it is assumed that there is no interaction between team members in the 
sequential process, thus emulating the ‘over-the-wall’ approach, where team members 
throw information over an invisible wall. In practice however, there exist interactions 
among members (or departments) of a team, though they may be very weak. Future work 
should consider this. It was stated that the expected payoff method assumes that individuals 
in a team work towards achieving common goals with common interests and beliefs within 
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the constraints of their work, all of which guide their behavior. For a CE team, this is 
conceivable in the sense that any ‘team’ usually works together to achieve some goal, and a 
cross-functional team, ideally, works towards the common project goals of being on time, 
and within budget. However, in practice there is tension between meeting project and 
functional goals, as team members have project-specific goals, but also have departmental 
obligations to fulfill. The same assumption is debatable for a sequential process, where 
functional teams in different activities tend to have differing goals. For example, in isolation, 
a designer’s goal is to create a product design without much concern for the production 
process that will build it. Similarly, a marketing manager’s goal is to get customers to buy 
the company product without much concern for how the product will be made. This is 
partly due to the fact that functional goals are tied to functional rewards. Taking into 
account this divergence of beliefs would require further analysis into economic and 
organization theory where individuals’ actions are based on self-interest. A more detailed 
description of the influence of time on the payoff function must be developed. Presently, it is 
assumed that interaction between action variables at different times is weaker the farther 
apart they are in time. However, if there is interaction between actions at different times, the 
payoff function will not be additive in time. The sequential process will have constraints 
which link actions that are distant in time, and can no longer be evaluated as a series of 
single-period problems, in which interaction is so weak that it does not exist. Most activities 
are not deterministic in a product development process. In fact, many situations arise where 
a stochastic relation between activities apply. A commonly occurring phenomenon is the 
failure of one or more activities, which consequently require rework. Rework loops in the 
network diagrams must be expressed to incorporate this very important characteristic of 
development processes. The function of rework in a network is to prevent the expected 
payoff from reaching a maximum when an activity is reworked, though a maximum can be 
reached after a few iterations but at a greater cost. The measure of the expected utility of a 
network has always been considered in its gross form, that is, without any consideration for 
the cost of the network. In reality, obtaining information can be very costly, and though one 
network may be superior to another in terms of the expected payoff, the cost of that network 
may not justify its use. This concept should also be incorporated into the models. 
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